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CASE COMMENTS
The proper functioning of the courts requires such a doctrine, since
most of the necessary proof and witnesses are readily available for
use in the second suit. Indeed, to borrow an analogy, one of the great
superiorities of equity over common law procedure is the opportunity
to settle all issues of a cause in one proceeding. If the nonresident can
demonstrate that his forced participation is in fact resulting in litigation in an inappropriate forum he can always request the court to
invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens to set aside the action.19
JosEPH

A. McGowAN

TORTS: LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTION FOR
NEGLIGENCE OF ITS SERVANTS
Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951)
Plaintiff sued defendant charitable hospital for an injury occasioned when a nurses' aide overturned her stretcher. The trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that a charitable
institution is not liable to a beneficiary for the negligence of its employees if it has used due care in their selection. On appeal, HELD,
charitable institutions are liable for negligent injury to all patients,
regardless of the degree of care used in the selection of the employee
who causes the injury. The court expressly overruled its former doctrine of nonliability of charitable institutions.' Judgment reversed.
Charitable institutions are made wholly or partially immune from
liability for the negligence of their servants by the great majority of
American courts.2 Two pioneer cases introduced this exception to
doctrine, but they can be explained by the salutary principle that as a matter of
public policy an individual should not prosecute in bad faith and should be forewarned that he will be liable to the accused if he does.
29Florida apparently recognized this doctrine in regard to nonresidents in Hagen
v. Viney, 124 Fla. 747, 169 So. 391 (1936). For a discussion of its merits in cases
of the instant type see Note, 26 IND. L.J. 459 (1951).
'Southern Methodist Hospital v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P.2d 118 (1935).
2For a collection of authorities, see Director of Georgetown College v. Hughes,
130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572,

68 So. 4 (1915).
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the doctrine of respondeat superior,3 each relying on English dicta
which had already been repudiated in England.5 A third American
case exposed the error and flatly rejected charitable immunity,6 but
the idea had taken root. The cases since then have continued to be
marked by both conflict and confusion.
The rule resulted from a natural reluctance to apply the harshness
of respondeat superior to charities; 7 but in searching for some satisfying legal principle upon which to base its reasoning the judiciary
has produced at least four diverse and largely unrelated theories, all
of which have been targets for criticism.
Those courts following the trust fund theory hold that, since all
funds are held in trust for specific charitable objectives, it is a breach
of trust to divert them to purposes not contemplated in the trust
and thus to thwart the benevolent designs of the donors." Though
widely adopted the theory has been criticized on the grounds that it
allows an immunity denied to other trusts and to charitably inclined
individuals 9 and that donors are presumed to know that the trust
property may have to meet these sporadic but in the long run inevitable expenses of carrying out the charitable purposes.' 0
The inapplicability of respondeat superior theory rests on the premise that a yield of profit to the master from the actions of his servant
is a prerequisite to application of the doctrine of respondeat superior;
therefore it should not be extended to institutions organized primarily
to aid humanity rather than to reap private gain."' Critics reply that

3Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885); McDonald v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
4Holliday v. Vestry of St. Leonard, 11 C.B.N.S. 192 (1861); Feoffees of Heriot's
Hosp. v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (H.L. 1846); Duncan v. Findlater,
6 C. & F. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839).
'Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L.R. I H.L. 93 (1866); Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
GGlavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879).
7See Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 362, 199 So. 344, 347
(1940).
sParks v. Northwestern Univ., 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905); Perry v. House
of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885); Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham
Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920); McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen Hosp.,
120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
9Bruce v. Central M.E. Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907).
'oDirector of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"E.g., Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895).
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the doctrine is not based on profit but rather on the relationship between master and servant, whereby the master is responsible for the
actions of the servant he commands.'1 The dispute here is, of course,
largely verbal.
Jurisdictions following the waiver theory reason that the patient,
by accepting the benefits of the Good Samaritan impliedly assumes
the risk, at least as against the hospital itself, of negligent injuries by
those servants that have been carefully selected. 3 Such waiver, however, is in fact seldom if ever in the minds of the parties, especially
that of a patient racked with pain, an unconscious or insane person,
or a child.14 Furthermore, waiver is said by some to imply freedom
of action, and a person in need of charity rarely enjoys such freedom.' 5
The fact nevertheless remains that many a waiver imposed by law is
not present in the mind of the waiving party and that few bargainers
give up anything as such voluntarily. The motive for any sacrifice
is election of either a compensating gain or hope of gain or avoidance
of a greater loss, yet these choices are as a rule not deemed involuntary.
The public policy theory stems from the conviction that benevolent
institutions, devoting their assets and energies to the relief of the
sick and needy, should not be held liable for payment of damages
when doing the best they can; charity, like government itself, should
be encouraged even at the cost of occasional hardship. 6 This concept
is the broad basis of all of the foregoing theories, although most
courts appear to be seeking a technical justification for the result that
they select as desirable. Critics find this last basis far less vulnerable
on logical grounds,17 but assert a contrary idea of public policy,
namely, that even charitable institutions should be just to each patient
before being charitable to others and that today their endowments
and insurance render such a policy feasible18 Whether the factual
' 2See Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 574, 68 So. 4, 9 (1915).
"3E.g., Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hosp., 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901).
'4See Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 138 Tenn. 616, 629, 200 S.W. 510, 512 (1918).

15See Director of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 826 (D.C. Cir.

1942).
16E.g., Southern Methodist Hosp. v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P.2d 118 (1935);
D'Amato v. Orange Mem. Hosp., 101 NJ. Law 61, 127 At. 340 (Ct. Err. & App.

1925).
"7See Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 367, 199 So. 344, 347

(1940).
'SE.g., Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950);
Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879).
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basis essential to this criticism is true, however, in view of the mounting demands on charity, is highly debatable; most organizations of
this type insist that they need more funds in order to carry their load.
A related argument is that to impose liability is to beget careful
management and efficiency. 19 Some courts subscribe to this proposition but reluctantly hold that legislative action is necessary to check
the momentum of stare decisis. -0 Others take the flat position that
only the legislature has the power to grant special immunity to charitable organizations, 21 a challenge that one early legislature chose to
meet.

22

In addition to the propriety of granting immunity from liability,
there is a confusing diversity of opinion as to the extent to which any
such immunity should lie, with the result that many states have modified the older absolute rule. For example, care in the performance of
such nondelegable duties as selection and retention of competent employees, 23 establishment of adequate regulations, and maintenance of
safe premises 24 has long been a prerequisite to immunity. Furthermore the bench is placing increasing emphasis upon the relationship
between the parties and is in many jurisdictions permitting recovery
by strangers, 25 invitees,2 6 employees, 27 and paying beneficiaries. 2 8
Only a few courts, however, have gone so far as to allow nonpaying
beneficiaries to recover in the absence of negligence in the selection
29
of servants.

")Sheehan v. North Country Com. Hosp., 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28 (1937).
2oCaughman v. Columbia YMCA, 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788 (1948).

2'Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940); Glavin
v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879).
22R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 213 (1909), as amended, R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 116, §95 (1938).
23
Evans v. Lavrence Mem. Hosp., 133 Conn. 311, 50 A.2d 443 (1946); Hoke v.
Glenn, 167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807 (1914). Contra: Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham
Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920).
24McInerny v. St. Luke's Hosp., 122 Minn. 10, 141 N.W. 837 (1913).
25E.g., Director of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.

1942); Andrews v. YMCA, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (1939).
26
E.g., Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc'y, 113 Conn. 188, 154 At. 435 (1931).
27

E.g., Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hosp., 197 N.C. 41,

147 S.E. 672

(1929).
2SE.g., Tucker v. Mobile Ins. Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Nicholson v.

Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940); Mississippi Baptist Hosp.
v. Holmes, 55 So.2d 142 (Miss. 1951); Vanderbilt Univ. v. Henderson, 23 Tenn.
App. 135, 127 S.W.2d 284 (1938).
29See note 36 infra.
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Encroachments upon the immunity of charitable organizations
have at times been based upon the locality of the mishap, that is,
whether "out on the highway" 30 or on business property operated for
profit. 3' A further exception has been made when business property
operated for profit, or other non-trust funds such as insurance,3 2 are
available to satisfy judgment; the judiciary has fortified this position
by a newly developed concept that the immunity doctrine is limited
to the trust
fund itself and does not extend to the charitable in33
stitution .
These modifications have been criticized as inconsistent with the
professed bases for immunity. Under the trust fund theory the immunity of the fund and the charity that it sustains should be complete, regardless of the relationship of the parties or the care used
in selection of servants. 34 Again, the mere fact that the injured party
is a stranger does not of itself require the application of the doctrine
of respondeat superior.3 5 Admittedly the foregoing exceptions are not
inconsistent with the waiver or public policy theories, but if allowed
they nonetheless create liability to everyone except those for whom
the charity is maintained. Money saved by immunity against beneficiaries is, in effect, used to compensate injured strangers.
The Supreme Court of Arizona is among the latest to adopt the
modem trend toward complete liability. At least nine other jurisdictions have apparently shifted to this extreme view,36 and in ad-

dition several courts are moving in this general direction.Y7 Some of

30Daniels v. Rahway Hosp., 10 N.J. Misc. 585, 160 Ad. 644 (C.P. 1932).
3'Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 138 Tenn. 616, 200, S.W. 510 (1918).
32Moore v. Moyte, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950); Vanderbilt Univ. v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S.W.2d 284 (1938). Contra: Herndon v. Massey, 217
N.C. 610, 8 S.E.2d 914 (1940).
3aSpivey v. St. Thomas Hosp., 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450 (1947).
34Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 Ad. 120 (1912).
35Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920).
3sDirectors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal.2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Durney v. St. Francis Hosp.,
83 A.2d 753 (Del. Super Ct. 1951); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 45 N.W.2d
151 (Iowa 1950); Geiger v. Simpson M.E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.W. 463
(1928); Sheehan v. North Country Com. Hosp., 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28 (1937);
Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.V.2d 247 (1946); Sisters of
Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P.2d 996 (1938); Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese, 70 A,2d 230 (Vt. 1950).
37Tucker v. Mobile Ins. Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Moore v. Moyle,
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the opinions contain reservations, including the New York view that
doctors and their nurses are independent contractors, for whose negligence the hospital is not liable; 3s and still others, including the instant opinion, suggest that certain charitable property might be immune to execution.
The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that liability extends to
paying beneficiaries and strongly hints that nonpaying beneficiaries
might recover.39 Florida, however, is in a situation differing from that
of many other jurisdictions. For decades our organic law has specifically informed the Legislature that "Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the State as to all liabilities now
existing or hereafter originating."' 0 Yet the Legislature has done
nothing in this connection.41 It is a bit cynical, to say the least, for
a government to hold a charitable institution up to standards allegedly
minimum while at the same time refusing to meet these standards
itself. No one is forced either to accept charity or to contribute to it.
But a citizen must deal with his government and pay taxes to support
it. The government, of all organizations, should be the first to observe the standards of conduct that it requires of the governed. When
Florida gets ready to assume its own responsibilities properly, a
statute imposing the same standards and liability on charitable institutions might be in order.
JOHN T.

ROGERSON, JR.

405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950); Spivey v. St. Thomas Hosp., 31 Tenn. App. 12,
211 S.W.2d 450 (1947); Bruce v. YMCA, 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929).
3sHamburger v. Cornell Univ., 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539 (1925); Schloendorff
v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Glavin v. Rhode Island
Hosp., 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879).
39Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
40FLA. CONsr. Art. III, §22.
41On rare occasions a trifling sum may be obtained by special bill, but the

amount is usually as inadequate as the grant of any damages at all is rare.
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